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Not for the Taking:
Murr v. Wisconsin and the Denominator Problem

Colton L. Adams*
INTRODUCTION

Some of the earliest fundamental privileges in American
jurisprudence are the bundle of rights we call "property rights.",
Private landowners with farms, oil fields, and mineral deposit
claims, for example, rely substantially on these rights to make a
living. As regulations have come into conflict with property landuse rights, however, it has grown increasingly important to
protect them from undue government burdens. In 2017, the
United States Supreme Court attempted to clarify the scope of
property-also known as the denominator-by evaluating several
2
variables to determine if a regulatory taking had occurred.
Unfortunately, the Court's multifactor test only serves to muddle
the already complex nature of regulatory takings, while limiting
Fifth Amendment protections afforded to property owners. Thus,
as the makeup of the Supreme Court evolves, it is vital that the
Court reconsider its approach. To uphold and protect property
rights, the Court must look to state-defined property lot linesnot litigation-specific definitions-to determine how government
regulations have impacted private property.
Regulations limiting land-use across the United States
have expanded in all levels of government over the last century.3
Courts initially sought to limit the administrative state by
narrowly interpreting federal power under the Commerce
Clause. 4 When courts began to broaden the scope of federal

*Notes Editor, KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES L., 2018-2019; B.A.
2015, Southern Adventist University; J.D. expected May 2019, University of Kentucky
College of Law.
I See Will Sarvis, Land and Home in the American Mind, 22 J. NAT. RESOURCES
& ENVTL. L. 107, 108 (2009).
2 See generallyMurrv. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
3 Jonathan Wood, Standing Up to the Regulatory State: Is Standing's
RedressabilityRequirement an Obstacle to ChallengingRegulations in an Over-Regulated
World?, 86 UMKC L. REV. 147, 148 (2017).
Id.
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power, however, the creation of regulations began to explode. 5
Now, in the twenty-first century, administrative agencies on the
federal and state levels have broad powers to regulate.6 As the
administrative state's regulatory powers have grown, it has also
come into conflict with many rights enjoyed by private citizens.
Landowners, in particular, have seen encroachments on their use
and enjoyment of property.7
Serving as an attempt to protect property owners from
government intrusion, the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "...
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation."8 Accordingly, under the Fourteenth Amendment,
this protection of private property rights applies not only to the
federal government but extends to states and municipalities as
well.9 Though initially only physical takings were protected,
courts began to recognize the concept of regulatory takings-or
inverse condemnation-as the regulatory state grew.1 0 Indeed,
courts have found that administrative regulations can limit a
landowner's use and enjoyment of their property so much that the
value of the property is effectively "taken" from the landowner."
Among the many issues to arise in regulatory takings
jurisprudence, a source of recent debate is the issue of what
property is relevant for a partial takings analysis.1 2 This concept,
known as the "parcel as a whole" rule looks at the proportionate
size of the loss, or denominator, compared to the property that
was not impacted.' 3 As a consequence, this denominator problem
is vital to a regulatory takings claim for both the landowner and
the government.14

5 Id. at 147.
6 Id. at 149; See also Gary Lawson,
The Rise and Rise of the Administrative
State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1994).
7Lawson supra note 6 at 1236.
8 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
10 See generally Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
11 Id. at 415.
12 See John E. Fee, Comment,
Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory
Taking Claims, 61 U. Cl. L. REV. 1535 (1994).
13 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987).
4 See Marc R. Lisker, Regulatory Takings and the DenominatorProblem, 27
RUTGERS L. J. 663, 713 (1996).
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Consider a hypothetical farmer who holds two adjacent
parcels of land, one with five acres (Parcel A) and the other with
forty-five acres (Parcel B). Suppose the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) determines that the land on Parcel A is protected
under the Clean Water Act, barring any development of that
property. When the farmer files a regulatory takings claim
against the EPA, if the court weighs Parcel A against the
combined size of both parcels, only one-tenth of the property has
been impacted, and the court is unlikely to hold that a regulatory
taking has occurred. Conversely, if the court looks at the parcels
separately and only weighs the impacted land against itself, now
all of the property has been impacted, and the court is likely to
hold there was a regulatory taking. Thus, defining the
denominator is important because it is in the landowner's
interest for it to be large and in the government's interest to limit
it.
In its attempt to bring clarity to the denominator problem,
the Supreme Court muddied the issue even more in Murr v.
Wisconsin." In Murr, the Court created a multi-factor balancing
test that looks at: "(1) the treatment of land under state and local
law, (2) the physical characteristics of the land, and (3) the
6
Unfortunately, in
prospective value of the regulated land."'
articulating this vague test for determining the denominator of
7
regulatory takings claims, the Court failed property owners.'
Rather than bringing clarity and predictability, the Court created
a convoluted test that is likely to create more litigation, while
granting strong deference to government at the expense of
citizens' rights.' 8
This Note proposes the creation of a new bright-line test to
determine the relevant parcel based on state-defined property
lines when courts evaluate regulatory takings claims. Part I will
examine the constitutional development of regulatory takings
under the Fifth Amendment. Part II will analyze the Court's
current multi-factor test as applied in Murr and explain why the

1s See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945 (2017).
16 Id. at 1945-46.
17 See Ilya Somin, A Loss for PropertyRights in Murr v. Wisconsin, WASH. POST:
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.comlnews/volokhconspiracy/wp/2017/06/23/a-loss-for-property-rights-in-murr-v-

wisconsin/?utmterm=.a02e8412bf69 [https://perma.cc/2T4K-3YQD].
18 Id.
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test is detrimental to farm and mineral land-use interests.
Finally, Part III proposes a new test that utilizes preexisting
state-defined property lines, which will give better protection to
private property and agricultural owners.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF REGULATORY TAKINGS
Although this Note does not serve as a critique of regulatory
takings, to understanding Murr and its application, it is
important to survey the constitutional development of regulatory
takings in the United States.
A. Pre-Pennsylvania Coal Takings
The primary type of government action covered by the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment for most of American
history was a physical invasion, appropriation, or use of eminent
domain over a person's property.' 9 There were few legal remedies
for limitations of land use and no such thing as a "regulatory
taking." 20 During the nineteenth century, regulations could bar
activities that were of public health, safety, or moral concern
without providing compensation. 2 1 These types of regulatory
powers were justified being a core part of the state's police power,
allowing states to regulate for the common good. 22 In
distinguishing between state takings and regulatory police
powers, Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote:
The power which the states have of prohibiting
such use by individuals of their property, as will be
prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety
of the public, is not, and, consistently with the
existence and safety of organized society, cannot
be, burdened with the condition that the state

19 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992); Robert Meltz,
Takings Law Today:A Primerfor the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 328 (2017).
2 Meltz, supranote 19, at 328.
21 See Danaya C. Wright, A New Time for Denominators: Toward a Dynamic
Theory ofPropertyin the Regulatory Takings Relevant ParcelAnalysis, 34 ENvTL. L. 175,
182-83 (2004); see also William Michael Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes:Reassessingthe
Significance ofMahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 813, 832 (1998).
2 See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-27 (1905).
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must compensate such individual owners for
pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of
their not being permitted, by a noxious use of their
property, to inflict injury upon the community. The
exercise of the police power by the destruction of
property which is itself a public nuisance, or the
prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby
its value becomes depreciated, is very different
from taking property for public use ... 23
State legislatures were allowed to regulate land use as long as
24
the regulations were promulgated in pursuit of public interest.
The Court's deference toward state police power remained its
preferred approach, even in cases where land-use requirements
eliminated private property interests. 25 This continued to be the
common treatment of government regulatory power and takings
claims until the early twentieth century. 26
During the latter part of the nineteenth century and the
early twentieth century, federal and state regulatory powers
began to expand. 27 Populist and Progressive Era politics
generally embraced a larger view of the government's regulatory
police powers. 28 Accordingly, many states began to pass laws to
increase public health and safety. 29 The concept of a regulatory
taking grew out of this expanded regulatory role of government.
B. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon
The Supreme Court's 1922 decision in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon signaled a major shift in modern takings
jurisprudence and the beginning of the Court's recognition of

2

Mugler

v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887).
Id.
2 Ron von Lembke, Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. Debenedictis and
the Status of Coal in Pennsylvania, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 227, 228 (1988).
26 See Mugler, 123 U.S. 623; see also Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678
(1888); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
27 See Robert L. Rabin, FederalRegulation in HistoricalPerspective, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 1189 (1986) (explaining the rise of the regulatory state and its impact on the judicial
3

24

system).
. Id. at 1191-92.
2 Id.
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regulatory takings.3 0 In Pennsylvania Coal, the Court questioned
the extent to which a state's police power could conflict with
existing property rights, thereby creating the modern framework
for regulatory takings cases. 31
Government regulatory powers were greatly enhanced
during the Progressive Era, often in an attempt to limit public
health and safety risks. 32 One safety risk the Pennsylvania
legislature sought to protect the public from was surface
subsidence. 33 By the end of the nineteenth century, coal
companies owned much of the land in the northern part of the
state. 3 4 In this region, it was common for coal companies like
Pennsylvania Coal to sell land to people with stipulations
allowing the companies to reserve mineral rights while waiving
any liability for property damage or personal injury. 35
Consequently, Pennsylvania enacted the Kohler Act in 1921,
which prevented coal companies from mining under inhabited
land in a way that would weaken the surface structure.3 6 In
Pennsylvania Coal, the Mahons' deed included a mineral right
stipulation, which inspired them to file for an injunction against
Pennsylvania Coal to prevent it from removing coal under their
home. 37 Ultimately, the Court held that the Kohler Act was an
inappropriate use of police power. 38 Writing for the majority,
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. noted that:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent
values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every such change in the
general law. As long recognized, some values are
enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield
to police power. However, the implied limitation
must have its limits, or the contract and due

- Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
Id. at 413.
3 Rabin, supra note 27, at 1229.
a Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412-13.
34Neal S. Manne, Reexamining the Supreme Court's View of the Taking Clause,
58 TEX. L. REv. 1447, 1451-52 (1980).
35
d.
- Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412-13 (determining that the Kohler Act is
unconstitutional).
3 Id. at 412.
3 Id. at 414.
3
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process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration
in determining such limits is the extent of the
diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude,
in most if not all cases there must be an exercise of
eminent domain and compensation to sustain the
act. 9
Because the value of mineral rights included the right to mine it,
the Court reasoned that the Kohler Act had the same effect of
appropriating Pennsylvania Coal's property interest for itself; to
the Court, even a strong public interest to improve public safety
40
was not enough to create an eminent domain shortcut.
Justice Holmes famously declared that "[tihe general rule
at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking." 41 This marked a major shift in the Court's Takings
Doctrine from favoring state police power to favoring private
property protections. 42 Justice Holmes, however, failed to provide
guidance as to when a regulation has gone "too far" and did not
explain how much diminution in value is enough to limit
regulation. 43 Thus, Pennsylvania Coal not only created a
foundation for modern regulatory takings cases, but it also
opened the door for continued legal debates over how far
regulations must go in order to be "too far."
C. Penn Central Transport Company v. New York City
For close to half a century after Pennsylvania Coal, the
Supreme Court heard few major cases concerning constitutional
checks on state regulatory power over property, validating most
land-use regulations." In Penn Central TransportationCompany
v. New York City, however, the Court finally articulated a

Id. at 413.
40 Id. at 416.
Id. at 415.
42 von Lembke, supra note 25, at 230.
13 Id. at 231; see also Manne, supra note 34, at 1452; Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S.
Ct. 1933, 1942 (2017).
See Wright, supra note 21, at 184; see also Mark W. Cordes, The Fairness
Dimension in Takings Jurisprudence,20-FALL KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 7 (2010).
3
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substantive test for determining when a regulation has gone too
far. 45

In 1965, the New York City Council passed the
Landmarks Preservation Law in an attempt to protect historic
landmarks

and structures

across the city.46

Effectively,

this

limited land-use decisions and prohibited renovation or
demolition of buildings in protected areas without approval from
the city. 4 7 At the time, Penn Central Transportation Company
owned Grand Central Station and sought to construct an office
building above it, which it planned to lease. 48 As a historic
landmark, Penn Central was required to obtain city approval
before making any structural changes. 49 After two of its proposals
were denied, Penn Central filed suit claiming that the New York
law had effectively "taken" its property by prohibiting it from
using its building rights.5 0 Specifically, Penn Central argued that
the law deprived it of "air rights," significantly diminishing its
property value.5 1
In response, the Supreme Court created two of the most
important concepts in regulatory takings jurisprudence. First, the
Court established a balancing test used to determine if a
regulation has gone "too far." 5 2 Such questions, the Court
acknowledged, are "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries." 5 3
Following Justice Holmes' approach in Pennsylvania Coal, the
Penn Central Court avoided a bright-line test and instead
identified three relevant factors to be balanced: (1) the economic
impact of the regulation, (2) the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with investment-backed expectations, and (3) the
character of the government's action. 54 In applying the new test,
the Court rejected Penn Central's attempt to bifurcate air rights
from its property interest in the preexisting structure and
recognized a doctrine that has come to be known as the "parcel as

45Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-39 (1978).
6 Id. at 109
47

Id.

Id. at 115-16.
9 Id. at 116.
5 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 119.
4

51

Id. at 130.

Id. at 123-24.
Id. at 124.
54 Id. at 124-28; see also D. Benjamin Barros, The Police Power and the Takings
Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 471, 517 (2004).
52
5
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a whole" or relevant-parcel doctrine.5 5 In explaining this doctrine,
the Court said: "'[tlaking' jurisprudence does not divide a single
parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether
56
rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated."
Instead, when determining if government action is a taking,
Justice William Brennan wrote that courts should focus on "the
character of the action and on the nature and extent of the
57
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole."

With this doctrine in mind, the Court continued its
analysis by applying the new balancing test to the terminal
property as a whole.58 Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that
the New York law did not constitute a taking.59
D. Post-Penn Central
Despite the Court's attempt to bring more clarity and
fairness to regulatory takings cases in Penn Central, its
balancing test has been criticized for its lack of coherence and ad
hoc nature of its application.6 0 In addition to these criticisms, its
recognition of the relevant-parcel doctrine has also been criticized
for the lack of guidance in defining what property is actually
relevant for a takings inquiry.6 1 Thus, the applicability of the
balancing test and the definition of the parcel as a whole became
a source of confusion and significant debate in the years following
Penn Central.62
The Court remained silent on exactly how to determine
what the relevant parcel is. 6 3 Except for articulating a separate
test for total takings of property in Lucas v. South Carolina

55 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S.

at 130-31.

56 Id.

5 Id.
8 Id. at 132-38.
5 Id. at 138; Tipton F. McCubbins, Regulatory Takings: What Did Penn Central
Hold? Three Decades of Supreme Court Explanation,21 S. L.J. 177, 178 (2011).
- See R. S. Radford & Luke A. Wake, Decipheringand Extrapolating:Searching
for Sense in Penn Central, 38 ECOLOGY L. Q. 731, 735 (2011); See also Eric R. Claeys, The
Penn Central Test and Tensions in LiberalProperty Theory, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 339
(2006); Steven J. Eagle, The Four-FactorPenn Central Regulatory Takings Test, 118
PENN ST. L. REV. 601 (2014).
6' Laura J. Powell, The Parcel as a Whole: Defining the Relevant Parcel in
Temporary Regulatory Takings Cases, 89 WASH. L. REV. 151, 160 (2014).
62 Id. at 154.

a Id. at 159.
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Coastal Council,64 the Court provided little to no guidance for
65
partial-takings cases beyond its balancing test in Penn Central.
This left the question of the denominator an implicit inquiry,
even among many lower courts. 6 6 Coincidentally, Justice Antonin
Scalia explicitly acknowledged the conundrum of defining the
denominator in dicta of the Lucas opinion:
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our . . . rule is
greater than its precision, since the rule does not
make clear the "property interest" against which
the loss of value is to be measured. When, for
example, a regulation requires a developer to leave
90 [percent] of a rural tract in its natural state, it is
unclear whether we would analyze the situation as
one in which the owner has been deprived of all
economically beneficial use of the burdened portion
of the tract, or as one in which the owner has
suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as
a whole. 67
Unfortunately, the Court ignored any denominator analysis
because of the nature of the claim in Lucas, leaving the problem
unanswered. 68

- See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (a regulation
which denies "all economically beneficial or productive use of land" will require
compensation under the Takings Clause); see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 553 U.S. 606,
617 (2001).
6 See Benjamin Allee, Drawing the Line in Regulatory Takings Law: How a
Benefits Fraction Supports the Fee Simple Approach to the Denominator Problem, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 1957, 1972 (2002).
6 Id.
67 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1045, n.7.
68 Though not covered in this Note, it is worth mentioning the Court's ruling in
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). Palazzolo involved an inverse
condemnation action brought by the landowner of property that was in a partial wetland,
protected by state regulations. While there was no denominator analysis, the Court
rejected the landowner's "loss of all economically and beneficial use" Lucas claim, finding
that the property still maintained a large value. In addition to this ruling, and perhaps
more importantly, the Court also held that regulations pre-dating ownership do not
absolve the state from a regulatory taking claim. For example, a landowner may purchase
property that is partially protected by state environmental regulations, and that in and of
itself does not necessarily prohibit them from challenging the regulations. As will later be
discussed, knowledge of pre-ownership regulations is likely a factor considered under
Murr v. Wisconsin.
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II. SOLVING THE DENOMINATOR PROBLEM
After years of applying the Penn Central and Lucas tests
to regulatory takings cases, the Court finally looked poised to
69
answer the denominator problem in Murr v. Wisconsin. While
not necessarily outcome determinative in and of itself, the
question of the relevant property is ultimately linked to whether
a regulatory taking has occurred. 70 As noted in an earlier case,
determining the denominator is important "[blecause our test for
regulatory taking requires us to compare the value that has been
taken from the property with the value that remains in the
property."7 1 The Court's solution to the problem, however, has
only served to muddle an already complicated area of
jurisprudence further.
A. Background of Murr v. Wisconsin
The Murr case involved a regulatory takings challenge to
72
a county ordinance in Wisconsin. In the 1970s, certain areas in
Wisconsin were given federal protection under the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act to protect the wild, scenic, and recreational
73
qualities for present and future generations. In accordance with
this law, Wisconsin passed an ordinance preventing development
74
on any lot under one acre, known as a substandard lot. The
regulatory language included a merger provision that prevented
adjacent substandard lots under common ownership from being
sold separately.7 5 These rules also included a grandfather clause
that relaxed restrictions on property owners as of January 1,
1976.76
The Murr family, petitioners, owned two contiguous
parcels of land along the St. Croix River, which was protected

69 Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1939 (2017).
7o Id. at 1943-44.
71 Id. (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
497 (1987)).
72 Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1940.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76

Id.
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under these parcel regulations.7 7 Although each lot was more
than 1.25 acres in size, the St. Croix waterline and the steep
banks overlooking the river severely limited the buildable land
area to about 0.98 acres. 7 8 Thus, these lots were subject to the
parcel regulations.
In the 1960s, before the regulations, the parents of the
petitioners purchased Lot F and Lot E separately.7 9 The title for
Lot F was transferred to the family's plumbing company where a
cabin was built, while Lot E was held in their names as a family
investment.8 0 These lots remained under separate ownership
until the 1990s when the lots were conveyed to the petitioners
and after the parcel regulations had been promulgated.8 1
Years after the conveyance, the Murrs wanted to move the
cabin on Lot F to a different portion of the lot because of flooding
difficulties with the cabin. 82 To fund this project, the Murrs
sought to sell Lot E. 83 However, because the lots were subject to
the parcel regulations, the Murrs had to obtain variances from
the county. 84 When the county denied their variance requests, the
Murrs filed suit claiming that the parcel regulations operated as
a regulatory taking.8 5
Before applying any categorical or balancing test, the first
task in a regulatory taking inquiry is to determine what property
is at issue.8 6 With this in mind, the Wisconsin court identified the
combined property-Lot E and F together-as the relevant
property for its analysis.8 7 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals
rejected the petitioners' request to apply the tests only to Lot E
and held that the lower court's takings analysis had "properly
focused on the regulations' effect 'on the Murrs' property as a
whole'-that is, Lots E and F together."8 8 Ultimately, the

77 Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1940.
78

Id.

79

Id.

80 Id. at 1940-41.
81 Id. at 1941.
8 Richard A. Epstein, Disappointed Expectations: How the Supreme Court
Failedto Clean Up Takings Law in Murr v. Wisconsin, 11 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 151, 160
(2017).
3 Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1941.
8 Id.
85 Id.
86

Id.

87

Id. at 1941-42.
Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1941 (quoting App. to Pet. For Cert. A-12).

88
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Wisconsin Court of Appeals found that the preexisting parcel
regulations were not a taking because the petitioners could not
have reasonably expected to bifurcate the lots and the economic
9
impact was minor.8
B. Murr'sMajority Opinion
Upon the grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court was
provided with an opportunity to resolve the denominator problem
90
by defining what property is relevant for a takings analysis.
Indeed, many legal scholars anticipated a new approach and
welcomed any clarity to the muddled jurisprudence of regulatory
takings. Unfortunately, however, the Court's opinion in Murr has
only added more confusion.
The Court was faced with three different approaches to
the denominator analysis. 9 1 The Murrs argued for a bright-line
rule that looked at the lot lines of the affected property to
determine the relevant parcel. 92 The Murrs' argument would
allow judges to deploy a more predictable analysis when
determining what property is relevant in a regulatory taking. The
State argued as well for a bright-line rule that looked to the
property's treatment under State law, again making it a more
predictable analysis. 93 The third and eventually prevailing
approach, presented by the United States in amicus, favored a
94
flexible, multifactor analysis.
The majority followed the trend of providing strong
deference to government regulatory powers, with Justices
Anthony Kennedy, Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia
Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan holding 5-3 against the Murrs and
in favor of the State.9 5 Rather than create a simple test for
determining the relevant property, however, the Court created

8 Id. at 1942.
9 Id. at 1939.
9' Id. at 1944-48.
92 Id. at 1947-48.

9 Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1946.
9 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1719, Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) (No. 15-214).
95 Justice Gorsuch did not participate in this decision, as he had not yet joined
the bench at the time of oral arguments.
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yet another multifactor balancing test. Writing for the majority,
Justice Kennedy explained:
[Nlo single consideration can supply the exclusive
test for determining the denominator. Instead,
courts must consider a number of factors. These
include [11 the treatment of the land under state
and local law; [21 the physical characteristics of the
land; and [31 the prospective value of the regulated
land. The endeavor should determine whether
reasonable expectations about property ownership
would lead a landowner to anticipate that his
holdings would be treated as one parcel, or,
instead, as separate tracts.9 6
Consequently, the introduction of an additional three-part
analysis to regulatory takings cases has led some to call the new
analysis "Penn Central squared."9 7 In practice, the Court's new
test requires lower courts first to do a Penn Central-type threepart analysis to calculate the relevant parcel. Once the relevant
parcel is determined, courts must then apply the three-part
analysis from Penn Central to determine if there has been a
regulatory taking on the relevant parcel.9 8 Effectively, Murr
requires two separate Penn Central analyses for each regulatory
takings inquiry.
By applying the new test, Justice Kennedy held that the
Murrs' two lots should be evaluated as a single parcel.9 9 Under
the first factor, Kennedy found the treatment of the property
under state and local law indicated that the property should be
treated as one because the regulatory burden preexisted the
petitioner's ownership.1 0 0 Under the second factor, he found the
physical characteristics of the two parcels were contiguous and
supported its treatment as a unified parcel.10 1 Finally, Kennedy

* Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945.
* Maureen E. Brady, Penn Central Squared: What the Many FactorsofMurr v.
Wisconsin Mean for PropertyFederalism, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 55 (2017).
9 Id.
9 Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1933.
Id. at 1948.
101 Id.
'0
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explained that the third factor was met because the value of the
two lots was greater together than separate. 102
C. The Roberts Dissent
The Murr majority has been highly criticized on both sides
of the denominator debate for creating another confusing,
unpredictable multifactor test. Among the critics were Chief
Justice John Roberts, and Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel
Alito in their Murr dissents.10 3 The Roberts dissent, in particular,
is important to this discussion for its reliance on state-defined
property rights.
While Roberts had no qualms with the majority's ultimate
holding, he questioned its decision to effectively redefine
principles of property rights. 104 He asserted that state law alone
should define the boundaries of property.1 05 Roberts reasoned
that state laws already define property lines and distinct units of
land; therefore, the Court ought not conflate the relevant parcel
with the question of whether a taking had occurred because they
are two entirely distinct questions.1 0 6 By leaving behind state
property principles, Roberts argued that the majority "authorizes
governments

to

...

create

a litigation-specific

definition

'property' designed for a claim under the Takings Clause."

of

07

D. Problems with Murr
As Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged, the denominator
analysis in Murr raises significant concerns for all property
owners.1 08 Despite some of the benefits of a multifactor test
touted by the majority, their approach creates a litigation-based
definition of property and weakens Fifth Amendment protection
by providing deference to government interests. By conflating two

Id. at 1948-49.
Justices Thomas and Alto joined in Chief Justice Roberts' dissent. In
addition to this, Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissenting opinion. Murr, 137 S. Ct.
at 1951.
104 Id.
1o5 Id. at 1952.
1on Id. at 1953.
1i Id. at 1954-55.
108 Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1954.
102
103
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separate and distinct analyses into a "Penn Central squared"
test, the Court muddled the definition of private property as it
has traditionally been understood.
Because of the creation of another multifactor test applied
at the preliminary phase, there is no clear answer for property
owners, legislators, or courts, as to what the relevant parcel
actually is. In fact, many questions remain unanswered, and
Murr's new test seems to create even more. What laws are
relevant to determine the treatment of the property: laws at the
time of purchase or laws leading to the litigation? What kind of
physical characteristics are particularly relevant? What is the
value of the regulated land and what if it is worth more
separately? Which factors are the most important and what other
factors are relevant? These are just some of the questions left
unanswered upon the application of the Murr test that are not
readily identifiable before litigation. Further, the factors listed in
Murr lack specificity and are difficult to measure, causing
confusion and uncertainty.1 0 9 Consequently, courts will likely
have to weigh these factors at the onset of litigation, before ever
hearing the merits of the takings claim. This litigation-based
definition of property will only serve to increase the time and
costs of challenging a regulatory taking, making the issue even
more complex.
In addition to the problems with clarity, particularly from
the perspective of landowners, the Murr test tends to allow more
deference to government entities at the expense of property
owners. Traditionally, Fifth Amendment protections were in
place to protect property owners from government interference.
This protection has grown increasingly important as the
regulatory state has grown, causing what some-such as
Roberts-have called an inherent imbalance in the clash of
interests between the common good and the interests of a few.1 10
However, rather than level the playing field, the Murr test only
serves to exacerbate the imbalance further in favor of the
government:n'

'0

See Somin, supra note 17.

110 Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1955.
111 Id.
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Whenever possible, governments in regulatory
takings cases will ask courts to aggregate legally
distinct properties into one "parcel," solely for
purposes of resisting a particular claim. Under the
majority's test, identifying the "parcel as a whole"
in such cases will turn on the reasonableness of the
regulation as applied to the claimant. The result is
that the government's regulatory interests will
come into play not once, but twice-first when
identifying the relevant parcel, and again when
determining whether the regulation has placed too
great a public burden on that property. 112
Accordingly, the Murr test undermines the Fifth Amendment's
protection by allowing the government's goals to shape the
playing field at the preliminary stage (determining the
denominator) before courts ever get a chance to analyze whether
a regulation goes too far.1 13
reasonable
interests,
government
considering
By
both the
at
factors
similar
and
expectations,
investment-backed
regulatory
a
whether
deciding
preliminary and merit stages of
taking has occurred, the Court created a muddled "Penn Central
squared" analysis. The outcome of Murr seems to incentivize
landowners to keep their parcels separate from the others in
order to fully protect the rights associated with each parcel:
Put simply,

[the Murr] decision ...

throws [the

definition of 'private property'] into the maelstrom
of multiple factors that come into play at the
second step of the takings analysis. The result: the
majority's new framework compromises the
Takings Clause as a barrier between individuals
and the press of the public interest. 114

112

Id.

113 Id.
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III. A NEW TEST

A. Alternatives to Murr
The Supreme Court's failure to articulate an answer to the
denominator problem before Murr left a void to be filled by legal
scholars and lower courts. In light of the slim majority's
ambiguous decision in Murr and the ever-changing make-up of
the Court, it is important to understand some old approaches to
the denominator problem in order to find the best solution. In
fact, during the years before Murr, there were a few dominant
solutions used.1 1 First, there were various multifactor tests,
which ultimately influenced Justice Kennedy's test in Murr. 116
Second, a bright-line rule emerged based on the contiguity of
parcels under common ownership.1 17 Finally, the bright-line rule
evolved based on state law.11 8
i. Federalcircuit m ultifactor analysis
Justice Kennedy's creation of a multifactor analysis for the
denominator problem in Murr was not the first time a multifactor
approach has been used as a solution. Before Murr, several
jurisdictions used various factors in their analyses of the relevant
parcel. Although no cases provided an exhaustive set of factors
for defining the relevant parcel, many courts implored similar
approaches.

" Different people have categorized the various denominator tests in a variety
of ways. Here, I look to those tests that are more widely accepted. See Lisker, supra note
14.
116 See Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994), abrogation
recognized by Bass Enterprises Prod. Co. v. United States 381 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
See also Palm Beach Isles Assoc. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000),
abrogationrecognized by Bass Enterprises Prod. Co. v. United States 381 F.3d 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
117 See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross
Currents in the Jurisprudenceof Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667 (1988); see also Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978); Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Concrete Pipe & Prods. of California, Inc.
v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602 (1993).
118 See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting); Richard A. Epstein,
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon: The Erratic Takings Jurisprudenceof Justice Holmes, 86
GEO. L.J. 875 (1998).
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Calling for "a flexible approach, designed to account for
factual nuances," 119 the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals'
acceptance of multifactor analyses encouraged other jurisdictions
to do the same. 120 In Ciampitti v. United States, the Federal
Circuit looked at four specific factors to determine the relevant
parcel in a takings challenge, while also leaving open the
possibility for other factors to be considered. 121 These four
relevant factors include consideration of: "(1) the degree of
contiguity, (2) the dates of acquisition, (3) the extent to which the
parcels have been treated as a single unit, and (4) the extent to
which the protected lands enhance the value of the remaining
lands."1 22 While no single factor was determinative, the Federal
Circuit's holding in Ciampitti put particular weight on the third
prong by ruling that two noncontiguous lots may be treated as a
single parcel for takings purposes when they are part of a single
transaction. 123
Other jurisdictions have either accepted the Federal
Circuit's approach or created their own multifactor tests in
response to the lack of guidance by the Supreme Court.1 24 Some
courts included several factual questions in their multifactor
analysis, such as asking when structures were built on a
property, the timing, and purpose for acquiring certain property,
and so forth.1 2 5 Similar to the approach used in Murr, several
jurisdictions also applied Penn Central factors such as the
economic viability of the property and the investment-backed
expectations. 126
Admittedly, these multifactor tests allow a certain degree
of flexibility for the courts to give weight to many relevant
considerations. Unlike in Murr, where the Court's goal was to
establish an objective test for the denominator, many lower

119 Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1181.

Allee, supra note 65, at 1988.
Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 318-19 (1991).
122 Id. at 318; see also Allee, supra note 65, at 1988.
'2 Fee, supra note 12, at 1547.
124 See Dist. Intown Props. v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1999);
K & K Constr., Inc. v. Dep't of Nat. Res., 575 N.W.2d 531 (Mich. 1998).
125 See E. Cape May Assocs. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 777 A.2d 1015, 1025 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); see also Fee, supra note 12, at 1547.
126 See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Palm Beach Isles
Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
120
121
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courts considered subjective criteria in their analyses. This
inclusion of subjective factors may lead to a broad or narrow
definition of the relevant property, depending on the facts specific
to the situation.1 27 This benefits courts seeking flexibility to
consider the facts of each case fully.
However, as noted in the critique of Murr's test above,
multifactor tests are extremely unpredictable and lead to
increased litigation. As Roberts indicated in his dissent,
consideration of other factors concerned with government
interests completely redefines the historical definition of
property.1 2 8 Questions of the investment-backed expectations, or
even the landowner's subjective purpose for owning the land,
ought to be questions asked later in the regulatory takings
analysis, not at the preliminary stage of defining the
denominator. 129 By accepting an undefinable list of factors and
applying them at each stage, these two separate inquiries are
conflated and make the ultimate outcome depend on the
denominator alone.
ii. Contiguous-common ownership approach
The second major proposal looks at whether the parcels in
question are under common ownership and the extent to which
they lie contiguously. Applying the unity-of-ownership concept to
questions of regulatory takings creates a straight-forward
analysis. This approach uses one of the most common boundaries
of a landowner's property-the entire contiguous property lineas the denominator for a regulatory takings analysis. By avoiding
an additional multifactor analysis, or some ambiguous test, a
unity-of-ownership approach to property allows a court to look at
the deed to determine the denominator.1 30
Because of its simplicity, many lower courts before Murr
used this simple definition without any lengthy discussion of
other rules.1st Some courts, however, explicitly indicated a
preference toward the common ownership approach in an attempt

27
'2

Fee, supra note 12, at 1547.
Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1955.

129 Id.
130 Allee, supra note 65, at 1982.
131 Fee, supra note 12, at 1546.
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to limit landowner manipulation. For example, in Bevan v.
Brandon Township, a Michigan court rejected the plaintiffs
attempt to sever property into distinct parcels to obtain
132
To the court, the division of
compensation for a taking.
property into separate parcels, or a horizontal severance, ought to
be an irrelevant fact in determining the denominator because it
could incentivize property manipulation:
If it were held to be so, the result would be that it
would be competent for landowners to perpetually
defeat future zoning restrictions by crisscrossing
their lands on a plat map with lines ostensibly
dividing the same into parcels so small that each
would be unsuited to any foreseeable use unless
combined with others. The test of reasonableness
may not be distorted or thwarted by any such
artificial device. 133
This "gamesmanship," as Justice Kennedy called it, was also a
particular concern during the development of the Murr test. "The
ease of modifying lot lines" Kennedy explained, "also creates the
risk of gamesmanship by landowners, who might seek to alter the
lines in anticipation of regulation that seems likely to affect only
134
part of their property."
Instead of recognizing the inherent value of each separate
parcel, the Michigan court defined the relevant parcel as the
plaintiffs entire commonly owned and contiguous property:
According to the [U.S. Supreme Court], the
"taking" analysis does not turn on the state's
recognition of a separate estate within the owner's
property, or whether state law allows the separate
sale of a segment of the property. "It is clear,"
takings
"that our
Stevens,
Justice
wrote
jurisprudence forecloses reliance on such legalistic
distinctions within a bundle of property rights."
[The Michigan Supreme Court] has recognized that

132
'i'

Bevan v. Brandon Township, 438 Mich. 385 (1991).
Id. at 396 (quoting Korby v. Redford Township, 348 Mich. 193, 198 (1957)).

131 Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1948.
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contiguous lots under the same ownership are to be
considered as a whole for purposes of judging the
reasonableness of zoning ordinances, despite the
owner's division of the property into separate,
identifiable lots. 13 5

In coming to this conclusion, the court relied on Justice John Paul
Stevens' analysis of Penn Central in Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, in which he conflated questions of vertical
severance (air rights in Penn Central) with horizontal severance
(contiguous parcels of land).136
One major concern of defining the relevant parcel as
contiguous land under common ownership is the adverse impact
it would have on larger property owners. 137 Large parcels are less
likely to suffer total economic losses because of the size of the
combined area, forcing larger landowners to either lose their
chance of showing a regulatory taking or severely limiting it. 1 38
This has led some critics to suggest that the Penn Central
diminution-in-value prong would be nearly impossible to prove
for large landowners, absent a greater loss in their property
rights. 139
Consider a similar situation to the facts in Murr. There
are ten neighboring families along the river with similar size
parcel dimensions, except the tenth family has two contiguous
parcels behind their riverfront plot. When the riverfront parcels
of all ten families are limited by regulations, the nine families
with only riverfront property would likely be compensated for a
regulatory taking. Applying this common ownership test, the
tenth family with the additional parcels behind the riverfront
parcel would not be compensated because their denominator
would encompass their entire property. This effectively punishes
a landowner for owning contiguous parcels and bars them from
compensation-despite having an equally-impacted parcel of land

Bevan, 438 Mich. at 395.
1* See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497
'3

(1987).
See Allee, supranote 65.
8 Id.
13 Fee, supra note 12, at 1552.
13
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like their neighbors. 140 Thus, the common ownership approach,
while easy to use, proves problematic upon application by failing
to account for each parcel's separate value fully, and by
discriminating against landowners with multiple parcels of
contiguous land.
iii. Why state propertylaws work best

Property rights are creatures of the state. That is, for most
of American history, state law has determined the boundaries of
individual parcels of land. Therefore, the best solution to the
denominator problem is to look at the distinct property lines of
the affected parcels. Rather than weighing an undefinable list of
factors, allowing a court to look at each parcel as a separate and
distinct piece of property is a clear and predictable way of
determining the value of the denominator. Unlike the common
ownership concept, this approach offers a consistent and
equitable way of identifying the relevant parcel-without limiting
the protections of larger landowners. Notably, this is the same
approach sought by the plaintiffs in Murr and was largely
supported by Roberts' dissent. 141 Despite Kennedy's rejection of
this approach in Murr, the Supreme Court should reconsider it to
differentiate between the denominator and merit stages of a
regulatory takings analysis.
While no court has regularly applied this distinct property
line approach, its clarity and consistency with commonly
understood principles of property law make it superior to the
dominant alternatives. 14 2 Scalia once wrote that a fee simple
interest "is an estate with a rich tradition of protection at
common law." 1 4 3 Similarly, Justice Potter Stewart also
acknowledged the common law benefits attached to property
interests and their creation:

141) See id.; see also Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1165, 1192-93 (1967); Allee, supra note 65, at 1984-85.
"'See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see
also Brief for Petitioners at 9, Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) (No. 15-214).
14 See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1956 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
4n See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1045, n.7 (Scalia, J., dictum).
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It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property
to protect those claims upon which people rely in
their daily lives, reliance that must not be
arbitrarily undermined ... Property interests, of
course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather,
they are created, and their dimensions are defined
by existing rules or understandings that stem from
an independent source such as state law-rules or
understandings that secure certain benefits and
that support claims of entitlement to those
benefits. 144
These
are the underlying principles
behind the Fifth
Amendment: state laws create and define private property rights,
and the Constitution ensures their protection.145 This approach
offers a clear, predictable, and consistent way of determining the
denominator. By using state-created parcel lines, courts would
show a greater level of respect for the state-law realm of property
rights, while affording property owners due protections.
In addition to its uniformity with common law principles
of property, this approach is also consistent with Penn Central.146
As Roberts noted, the "parcel as a whole" language used in Penn
Central was a response to attempts to vertically sever certain
rights from the bundle.1 4 7 This conceptually-created vertical
severance should not be confused with state-created horizontal
lines that separate different parcels. "Th[e] risk of strategic
unbundling is not present when a legally distinct parcel is the
basis of the regulatory takings claim." He further explained that
"the government must take those [state] rights as they find
them."l48
One alleged drawback to this approach is what critics
have suggested is a dual incentive for both the landowner and the
government of Kennedy's "gamesmanship." 14 9 If the state can
create and define property rights, what stops it from gaming the

144 See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
145See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
146
17

48

See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
See id. at 1953 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

Id.

11 Id. at 1948.
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system by enacting laws to consolidate certain types of property?
After all, in Murr, it was the application of the state's laws that
led to the holding that two lots should be considered one parcel0
despite being two distinct plots. 15 Similarly, Kennedy criticized
this approach for what he saw as an easy way for landowners to
modify lot lines and increase the chance a total taking had
15 1
But, as
occurred, or in anticipation of new land-use regulations.
Roberts responded, "such obvious attempts to alter the legal
landscape in anticipation of a lawsuit are unlikely and not
particularly difficult to detect and disarm." 152 Besides, states
cannot simply sidestep Fifth Amendment protections by
eliminating traditional property interests long recognized under
state law.15 s
Unlike the common ownership approach, using statecreated property lines to distinguish between separate legal and
economic parcels ensures that the value of each individual parcel
is recognized. This approach also treats all parcels equally by
allowing landowners an equal cause of action in a regulatory
takings claim, regardless of how much unaffected or contiguous
land they own. 154 Consider the hypothetical presented earlier:
when nine families-each owning one parcel of equal size along a
river-are impacted by a new land-use restriction. By using
distinct property lines, the tenth family with a second contiguous
parcel has the same cause of action, with no additional burden. In
this situation, the single affected parcel becomes the denominator
for the regulatory takings analysis, without consideration of any
contiguous property.
A bright-line test based on state-defined property lines
stands in direct contrast to the multifactor test in Murr. Despite
accusations of its inflexibility, this approach is a clear and
consistent way of determining the bounds of the relevant
property.15 5 Rather than determining how much of someone's
property should be analyzed with a list of ambiguous and
inconsistent factors, a parcel-based approach would afford some

i50 Nicole Stelle Garnett, From A Muddle to a Mudslide: Murr v. Wisconsin, 2017
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 131, 148 (2017).
'5i See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1948.
152 Id. at 1953.
153 Id. (quoting Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 167 (1998)).
IS5 CL Allee, supra note 65.
15r Allee, supra note 65, at 1995.
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level of predictability to the first step of the regulatory takings
claim. It would reaffirm the fact that the denominator and the
extent of a regulation's impact should be two separate and
distinct questions. 15 6 Ultimately, this approach rejects a
litigation-specific definition of property and restores it to its
status as a bundle of state-defined property rights.1 5 7
CONCLUSION

The United States has a long history of protecting the
private property rights of individuals against interference from
the government.1 5 8 By protecting private property rights, the
Takings Clause "stands as a buffer between property owners and
governments."15 9 Throughout the twentieth century, as the
regulatory state has expanded, this "buffer" has become even
more critical. As regulations interfere more and more with
private property interests, the scope of regulatory takings
jurisprudence has grown increasing muddled. The Supreme
Court's attempt to bring clarity to the denominator issue in Murr
only served to confuse a complex body of law further.
Consequently, this multifactor test was a blow to private property
rights because it created a litigation-specific definition of property
and conflated two distinct steps of the regulatory takings
analysis-severely limiting the rights of farmers and other
landowners with contiguous parcels.
Rather than rely on vague, inconsistent balancing tests to
define what "property" is, looking to state property lines would
provide a consistent definition for landowners across the country.
Though lower courts articulated a variety of denominator tests
before Murr, these multifactor tests and common ownership
approaches have significant issues. If the Court were to
reevaluate its analysis in future cases by accepting Roberts' state
law approach to property, this would not only bring much-needed
clarity to regulatory takings but reaffirm the importance of

166 See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1951.
157 See Id. at 1954-55.
'68 See generally David A. Thomas, Why the Public Plundering of Private
Property Rights is Still a Very Bad Idea, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 25 (2006)
(explaining the history of government involvement in private property, and the goal of
preventing unnecessary governmental interference).
59

Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1951 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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protecting private property interests. Embracing this approach
would draw a clear distinction between two main parts of a
regulatory taking analysis: identifying the impacted property and
determining whether a regulatory taking has occurred. By using
common law principles of property to resolve the muddled
denominator problem, the Court may finally show that private
property rights are not for the taking.
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